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Building the Case for Industrial
Strategy
David E. Bonior*
The argument for an industrial strategy begins with the failures of present
policies. The indictment is not concerned with the relative simplicity or elegance
of competing economic theories but with actual results in the world marketplace.
The case for an industrial strategy is not primarily about compassion, or about
full employment, or even about economic growth. While we desperately need a
compassionate economic policy, full employment, and sustained economic
growth, these are goals. The industrial policy debate is not a debate about goals,
but means. The argument rests on the premise that the old means must be
changed because the world marketplace has changed fundamentally during the
last three decades. Industrial strategy concerns how the United States (U.S.)
should adjust to the new world market.
America also needs sound and consistent macroeconomic policies, a tax policy
that is not at war with fiscal policy, and a fiscal policy that allows for a more
expansive monetary policy. Yet macroeconomic policies alone will not protect
America's position in a world marketplace where the primary issue is the relative
competitiveness of individual industries.
I. THE U.S. POSITION IN THE WORLD MARKET
Following World War II, the international dominance of the United States
allowed us to avoid, for a time, an explicit national strategy to sustain our
industrial lead. As Bluestone and Harrison have noted, "[tihe United States
emerged from the Second World War with the only major functioning army, with
more than half of all the usable productive capacity in the world, and as the
banker and creditor to both former allies and former enemies".1
Today, that era is over. In the past twenty years, the world economy has
become more integrated and competitive. As other nations have surged forward
in the new economic order, the influence of the United States has ebbed.
Indicators of this transformation are striking. In the early 1960s, a mere 25
* Member of the United States House of Representatives (D-Mich.); B.A. 1967, University of
Iowa; M.A. 1972, Chapman College; Honorary Doctorate of Laws 1984, Gallaudet College.
1. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA: PLANT CLOSINGS,
COMMUNITY ABANDONMENT, AND THE DISMANTLING OF BASIC INDUSTRY 112 (1982).
36 MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES
percent of all goods produced in this country faced international competition for
U.S. domestic markets. Today, the figure is 75 percent.2 The problem is not
limited to the industrial heartland or even to the so-called "basic" industries. In
almost every capital goods and high technology industry, the United States' share
of the world market dropped in the 1970s.
More is at stake in this decline than America's world influence. As a recent
report by a House Banking Subcommittee concluded, "...ten years ago, we
defined the 'structural unemployment' rate at three or four percent. Today, the
Council of Economic Advisers estimates that rate to be about seven percent, that
is, over seven million Americans who would not be able to find jobs, even after a
full economic recovery." ' 3 This structural problem is aggravating the episodic
swings of the business cycle. As a result, recessions are becoming deeper and our
recoveries more precarious.
It would be easy to blame our problems on one President or one political party,
but the twenty year pattern bridges too many administrations. It also bridges too
many different macroeconomic policies to sustain the thesis that one more at-
tempt at fine tuning will solve our problems.
In the future, global economic leadership and our domestic prosperity will
depend on America's ability to adapt to the changing conditions of the world
marketplace. If the trends and policies of the past continue, the U.S. world role
will be diminished and our economic prospects will decline. The argument for
industrial strategy is, above all, an argument about how we can meet this urgent
national challenge. The United States must recognize that it cannot sustain pros-
perity through economic isolationism or through its previous pattern of economic
dominance. Our nation must address the changing international context, and we
must learn from other nations which have, for decades, been more self-conscious
in their efforts to achieve economic growth and international advantage.
II. THE JAPANESE MODEL
Japan is the starting point for many arguments about industrial policy. Due to
its impressive growth rate, its favorable balance of trade with the United States,
and the penetration of its products into the American domestic market over the
last two decades, Japan's "success" has stimulated the industrial strategy debate
in this country.
As has been carefully catalogued by the General Accounting Office, the Jap-
anese Diet has adopted measures for both emerging and mature industries. Two
"Extraordinary Measures," for example, helped guide promotion of the elec-
tronic, information and machinery industries. The first was effective as early as
1971. Mature industries have received similar attention. In addition to several
generations of Textile Acts, in 1978 the Diet passed the "Structurally Depressed
Industries Law." These measures are matched by several laws specifically
focused on the needs of displaced workers. 4
2. HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., IST SESS.,
FORGING AN INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY 5 (Comm. Print 1983).
3. Id. at 1.
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Industries Law." These measures are matched by several laws specifically
focused on the needs of displaced workers. 4
At the center of the Japanese industrial strategy process lies the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI). MITI functions through national and
regional bureaus that develop and coordinate policies both to help specific indus-
tries and to address problems that cut across all industries. In essence, MITI
institutionalizes a process, not a plan. Its most basic role is to facilitate consen-
sus. This consultative process is reflected in the "Industrial Structure Council,"
an advisory group first created in 1964. Representatives of management, labor,
academia, and consumers sit on the Council. Once each decade, the Council
issues a major report, usually referred to as a "Vision Statement." The Vision
Statements seek to articulate a broadly shared consensus on Japan's fundamental
economic strategy. Because of the Council's wide representation, the Vision
Statements are the product of careful negotiation which balances the economy's
potentially competing interests.
The Council's most recent report, The Vision of MITI Policies in the 1980s,
reveals a nation reaching for a strategic consensus responsive to new problems.
Having achieved rapid industrial development, manufacturing growth is not di-
rectly mentioned at all in the three proposed national goals. Instead, economic
growth is sought through a policy promoting Third World consumption and
moving Japan aggressively forward as the world's most technologically intensive
producer.'
It is an extraordinary document which expresses the potential power of a
cooperative strategy. It marries a clear vision of the world marketplace with an
equally clear vision of Japan's future role in that market. The document gains its
power, however, not merely from the consensus it reflects, but from the ease with
which the Japanese draft their government to the service of the new vision. Given
the consultative process, government action in support of industrial strategies in
Japan cannot easily be derided as government intervention. More accurately, the
government sits, with its own resources, as one party at the table. As required by
the evolving consensus, those resources, like the resources of the other parties,
can be used on behalf of any strategic plan.
For example, the development of an industrial robot industry required a large
domestic market. That, in turn, required that small and medium size firms
become potential buyers. Yet it is difficult for smaller firms to finance large,
long-term loans like those required for industrial robots. Enter the Japan Devel-
opment Bank. The Bank lent money to help create a new financing institution
which in turn made loans at rates below market to small and medium size firms to
help purchase industrial robots. Today, Japan has one-half of the world's installed
industrial robots. 6 This increases the productivity of other Japanese industries,
4. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/ID-82-32, INDUSTRIAL POLICY: JAPAN'S FLEXIBLE AP-
PROACH (1982).
5. LOOK JAPAN, May 10, 1980, at 10 (reprinting a summary of The Vision of MITI Policies in the
1980s, Recommendation of the Industrial Structure Council (Mar. 1980)).
6. The General Accounting Office did a special study of the Japanese robot industry as part of its
review of Japanese industrial strategy. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE GAO/ID-83- 11, Japan Gears
up for Robots, in INDUSTRIAL POLICY: CASE STUDIES IN THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE 19-31 (1982).
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helping Japan become the world's most technologically intensive manufacturer. It
also gives Japan a significant edge in the potentially enormous industrial robot
market. Japanese firms are now exploring plans for export promotion.
The Japan Development Bank did not pick one firm over another or one robotic
design over another. Instead, it expanded the available pool of buyers by easing
financing, and then let new purchasers make their own decisions. This is market
intervention of a special sort. It is intervention to expand the market.
The United States need not borrow Japan's specific institutional arrangements.
We need to look beyond the details to the two notions that animate the system: the
conviction that government has a positive role to play in economic development
and the firm belief in cooperative decision making. These are values, not institu-
tions, but they are the values that underlie and make possible an industrial
strategy that would meet America's needs.
III. THE UNIQUE AMERICAN SETrING
Pointing to America's decline, some industrial strategists assume that current
U.S. economic problems alone justify an industrial policy. Yet that argument
skips an important point. Proving the failure of our present policies does not, by
itself, prove that an industrial strategy will be effective. International com-
parisons are sometimes used to fill the gap in the argument. Proponents contend
that the value of industrial strategy is proven by its success elsewhere. Yet those
comparisons provide only half an argument. While comparative analysis is essen-
tial, it is also difficult because of the United States' distinct political and cultural
traditions. The question of the viability of foreign answers to the American
setting remains.
Japan's success cannot be explained without acknowledging distinct Japanese
traditions. As Magaziner and Hout emphasize in their seminal book on Japan's
industrial strategy, a "clear sense of common purpose" pervades Japanese soci-
ety. While conflicts of interest have always existed between the government and
business leaders, as well as between the competing business leaders themselves,
there is a "commonly accepted and extremely well-developed process to resolve
conflict. "I
The Japanese people's particular cultural view of the state helps to ease the
direct role of the Japanese government in resolving conflict and reaching consen-
sus. K. Haitani illustrates the importance of Japanese cultural traditions:
In the traditional view, the whole nation is a family; what the house is to a
biological family, the state is to the national family. The state is not merely a part of
the system, but the very framework of it .... To the Japanese way of thinking, then,
the state does not "interfere" with the affairs of private business. It merely manages
itself, exercising authority and control over its constituencies.'
These cultural traditions seem foreign to America. From the time of the
nation's founding, American political ideology has emphasized the inevitability
7. Magaziner & Hout, Japanese Industrial Policy, 15 POL'Y INT'L AFF. 39 (1980).
8. Id. at 37.
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of conflict rather than the possibilities for consensus. The public interest is best
guarded, it has been assumed, by encouraging the free competition of a multi-
plicity of individual and group interests.
Federalist No. 51 stated this thesis when describing how a federal republic can
protect its citizens from injustice:
Whilst all authority in [a republic] will be derived from and dependent on the
society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of
citizens, that the rights of individuals will be in little danger from interested com-
binations of the majority.9
The U.S. Government was structured to incorporate this kind of competition of
interests through the establishment of three separate branches. It was believed
that the checks and balances inherent in the separation of powers would prevent
any branch from attaining overwhelming power and would, in turn, prevent
government itself from achieving the kind of singlemindedness that would allow
it to trample on any one group in the name of any other.
Over time, this political ideology became wedded to an economic view which
extolled the virtues of the free market. Economic competition was viewed as the
preeminent forum for the competition among interests that protected the public
welfare. The market became the guardian of both individual freedom and the
general prosperity.
Today, at times, our political debate seems framed solely by the belief that
America's economic growth has been wrought by the free market and that gov-
ernment action is "intervention" and almost definitionally wrong. At best, gov-
ernment is defended as the well-meaning purveyor of the welfare state. At worst,
it is criticized as a burdensome bureaucracy threatening to stifle business. Critics
of industrial strategy point to this ideological tradition as a fatal obstacle to the
development of an explicit industrial strategy in this country. Even proponents
concede that the real barriers to adopting an American industrial strategy are
political, not economic. The most difficult issue is not whether an industrial
strategy is economically necessary but whether it is politically feasible.
Yet the currently visible attack on government is not the real heir to the
traditional American distrust of concentrating power in any one interest group. A
closer examination of American history reveals another, even more durable,
ideological tradition. Americans have not always viewed the government's eco-
nomic role with suspicion. Indeed, it was not until the end of the nineteenth
century that a significant sector of American society vigorously championed the
doctrine of laissez-faire.10 Alexander Hamilton's "Report on Manufacturers,"
from the early years of the republic, was among the first to argue that the
government should play an active role in the promotion of promising sectors of
9. The Federalist No. 51, at 351 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
10. The following discussion owes much to Andrew Shonfield's authoritative comparison of
economic policy and institutions in Western Europe and the United States. See A. SHONFIELD,
MODERN. CAPITALISM (1965) (especially ch. 8). Also of interest are Chandler, Government Versus
Business: An American Phenomenon, in BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY (J.T. Dunlop ed. 1980), and
Vogel, Why Businessmen Distrust Their State: The Political Consciousness of American Corporate
Executives, 8 BRIT. J. POL. ScI. 45 (1978).
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the economy. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the en-
trepreneurial role of government, either independently or in tandem with private
enterprise, was widely accepted.
After the Civil War, the rise of vast industrial corporations fundamentally
altered the character of the nation's economic development. These corporations
no longer faced the kinds of capital shortages that prompted government action in
earlier years. While the government subsidized railroad construction, enacted
tariffs, and provided other vital support for industry, the new corporate leaders no
longer viewed the government as a real, in other words, financial, partner.
When, near the turn of the century, government leadership was again sought in
economic affairs, it was to restrain the abuses of corporate giants. Riding a wave
of anti-monopolistic sentiment, government was championed as the trustbuster
which would preserve the competitive world. Trustbusting reflected the American
concern with concentrating power in the hands of any limited interest, but the
enemy was not the government. Indeed, it was government that promoted the
competition among interests. For the trustbusters, the basic problem was how to
put government to the service of the economic need of the moment. Yet the result
was an unusually clear vision of the relationship between government and busi-
ness. Government stood against and separate from business as the regulator of the
public interest. From this period, more than any other, we derived the view of
government and business as adversaries.
This regulatory view carries important implications. From the business per-
spective, the least government is the best government. For the new government
regulators, the immediate problem is no longer how to help the differing business
interests in the service of national growth, but how to ensure compliance from
potentially hostile industries.
The Great Depression shook the nation's faith in continued economic growth.
Despite the attraction of the rising ideology of limited government action in the
economy, the government was given rein to engage in bold experimentation to
revive a shattered economy. New government programs underpinned a new era of
economic prosperity.
In the period since World War II, our tremendous productivity in agriculture
was stimulated, in large part, by government policies. These included support for
the price of agricultural commodities, government irrigation projects to open up
otherwise untillable lands, agricultural research, and efforts to assist farmers in
adopting modern production techniques. Our massive commitment to an inter-
state highway system, justified as a measure to improve our national defense, not
only facilitated commerce but was, in effect, a subsidy to the automobile industry
at the expense of the railroad industry. Our commitment to place a man on the
moon stimulated aerospace, electronics, computers and other industries."
In contrast to the rigidities of free market theories, each of these programs was
an experiment. Each was extemporized to meet a pressing need, yet involved a
conscious, pragmatic policy decision with significant microeconomic effects.
The future of whole industries was shaped by the gambles of these programs. In
11. T. MAGAZINER & R. REICH, MINDING AMERICA'S BusNEss 223 (1982).
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no case could the free market alone have provided the necessary resources,
expertise and incentives.
America has been a country of two minds. Its deep distrust of concentrated
power has been quoted in the name of limited government while at the same time
the nation assumes that its government should do what is necessary to ensure
economic growth. A tendency to debate economic policy in highly ideological
terms derived from free market theories has coexisted with a pragmatism devoid
of ideologies or any rigid theoretical frameworks. Compared to the ideological
tradition that argues against government action, the pragmatic tradition is rela-
tively mute precisely because it is suspicious of theories and committed to experi-
mentation. Yet the pragmatic tradition, whatever its intellectual handicaps, is the
dominant tradition in American government, as reflected in the persistent will-
ingness to mobilize the government to spur prosperity.
The success of Japan counsels Americans to listen to their pragmatic roots and
to respond creatively to the competitive problems created by the new World
marketplace. American history suggests that the American people will take the
risk. Industrial strategy is today's experiment, the heir to the pragmatic tradition
in American government.
IV. BUILDING A CONSENSUS FOR AN INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY
An industrial strategy is built through consensus. "Consensus," however, is
merely the latest buzzword designed to hide a hard process. An industrial strat-
egy is about sacrifice: wage concessions, dividends foregone, spent tax dollars.
Consensus occurs when competing interest groups agree on a formula for shared
sacrifice in pursuit of common goals. Yet America's government institutions are
designed to protect each group against sacrifice. Reflecting our distrust of con-
centrated power, American politics is characterized by a fragmentation of govern-
ment power and a proliferation of special interest groups each free to fight for
itself against all others. In our nation, competitive, even adversarial systems pit
labor against management, business against government. When government acts,
it seldom plays the neutral broker arbitrating between special interests. More
often, it merely commits its resources to the needs of each interest in turn.
American history suggests that the present ideological debate over industrial
strategy is ultimately irrelevant. Americans have been willing to draft their gov-
ernment to meet their needs despite almost any theoretical problem. Yet the
likelihood of government action does not prove the action will be effective. The
final argument against industrial strategy is that it will inevitably fail given the
structure of America's government institutions.
Magaziner and Hout emphasize the "competitive realism and economic logic"
that has allowed Japan to consciously seek advantage in the international mar-
ket. 2 But if America's political institutions continue to subvert shared sacrifice,
then our country will fail in an effort to define problems realistically and to
accept economic facts of life. In Congress, the tendency toward "log-rolling,"
12. Magaziner & Hout, supra note 7, at 2.
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abetting parochial concerns through pork barrel politics, combined with the
difficulty of coordinating the decisions of a wide range of committees with
competing interests work against the development of an explicit industrial
strategy.
The Executive Branch also lacks the necessary institutional arrangements to
coordinate policies. 3 The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) was created in
1947 to improve the quality of economic advice the President receives, but, since
that time, even macroeconomic decision making has become difficult to
coordinate.
The Federal Reserve retains autonomous control over monetary decisions,
while the Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the CEA, and Director of the
Office of Management and Budget all compete in setting tax and budget policy.
Meanwhile, microeconomic decisions have become increasingly important and
involve almost every agency in the federal government. Fragmentation in the
Executive Branch reinforces fragmentation in Congress by nearly ensuring that
each competing Congressional faction and organized special interest will have its
own Executive Branch supporter.
Critics of industrial policy argue that special interest politics in particular
presents an insurmountable obstacle to the development of a consensus-based
industrial strategy. Some argue that any effort to make industrial policy in a more
explicit fashion will cause an even greater mobilization of special interests, and
exacerbate the tendency to substitute political for economic criteria in decision
making. 14
Other critics argue that the current fragmented and decentralized system pro-
vides essential protection for economic rights. Fragmentation may be inefficient,
the argument goes, but it is not as dangerous as the possibility that corporate-
government collusion at the public expense or, even worse, joint corporate and
union collusion, could arise from cooperative modes of economic decision mak-
ing. 15
The first criticism ignores the fact that advocates organize their power in
response to the structure of political institutions. A fragmented, decentralized
system creates huge incentives to organize along narrow lines. That allows
groups to focus on just those points in the system important to each narrowly
drawn interest.
As Shonfield observed nearly two decades ago, "it is the competitive theory of
administration inside the government, rather than any ungovernable com-
petitiveness outside it, which makes the American case special." 6 Rather than
bemoaning special interests as inevitable, it is possible to organize government in
forms less likely to require special interest advocacy.
The second criticism ignores the fact that the current pattern of special interest
advocacy has done little to restrain the power of well funded special interest
13. See Porter, The President and Economic Policy, in THE ILLUSION OF PRESIDENTIAL GOVERN-
MENT 203-07 (H. Heclo & L. Salaman ed. 1981).
14. See, e.g., Schultze, Industrial Policy: A Dissent, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1983, at 3; see also
Kantrow, The Political Realities of Industrial Policy, HARV. Bus. REV. Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 83.
15. In addition to classic conservative critiques of government intervention, see the progressive
critique of Lekachman, The Limitations of Industrial Policy, NEW LEADER, Sept. 19, 1983, at 5.
16. See A. SHONFIELD, supra note 10, at 353.
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groups, including corporations and unions. Indeed, when decisions about the
expenditures of public funds are fragmented and decentralized, they are more
likely to be dominated by special interests. The federal government has become a
vast and extremely crowded battlefield. With dozens of subcommittees, agencies
and White House offices to choose among, a well-funded interest able to focus on
a special need with persistence will sooner or later find at least one path to its
goal. With so many battles going on at once, the chance that any single skirmish
will be discovered is small. Its chance of being publicly reported is even smaller
and the profusion of national media coverage has reduced most reporting to one
day stories with little or no public impact.
Our government institutions do frustrate some action, but it is not the action of
special interests that is particularly vulnerable. It is action in the general interest,
broad in its implications and requiring the coordination of our dispersed govern-
ment, that has been made almost impossible.
Our nation's long list of industrial policies reflects the problems in our existing
political arrangements. Fear of government involvement has not prevented enact-
ment of such policies. Instead, it has created an environment where industrial
policies emerge from the pattern of special interest politics.
The most important set of these "back door" industrial policies lies in the
U.S. tax code. Corporations receive extensive aid through tax breaks, technically
called "tax expenditures." In fiscal year 1984, corporate tax breaks will cost $70
billion. Yet decisions concerning who shall benefit under the tax code are not
even subject to the regular budget process that sets priorities in other spending
areas. Today, the energy industry, the commercial banking industry, and the
paper and wood industry-to pick just three winners-pay essentially no taxes.
The auto and pharmaceutical industries-to pick two losers-face a tax rate near
the legal limit. Is this rational? More to the point, against what standards of the
national interest have such policies been judged?
No industry opposes a gift from its government. Given the logic of special
interest politics, no industry opposes a gift to another industry unless the gift
would create competition. The essence of special interest politics is to satisfy
each interest in turn while postponing competition. The result is not less govern-
ment involvement, but rather policies that are ad hoc, inefficient and un-
disciplined by any overriding public purpose.
America is historically suspicious of the power of special interests and has
sought to write that distrust into its governmental institutions. In fact, in the name
of fighting special interests, our existing institutions create an environment where
the special interests operate at a distinct advantage.
Proponents of industrial strategy are not necessarily arguing for a greater
government role, or a greater corporate role, or a greater union role. Rather, they
are arguing for a forum that would allow economic decisions to be evaluated
against a consensually derived criteria of what would most improve the com-
petitive capacity of the nation as a whole.
V. CONCLUSION
As the mute tradition in American politics, the pragmatic tradition operates at
a disadvantage against free market theories. Industrial strategy, proposing to
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meet that disadvantage, offers a theory of the government's role in assisting
economic growth. That theory has powerful implications. It would subject the
long list of government favors to industry to an exacting standard. Some would
survive the test and others would not.
Free market advocates say that any review process will produce a list of
winners and losers, and so it will, but that is hardly a new problem. The existing
system produces winners and losers as well. Industrial strategy is only controver-
sial because some of today's winners might become tomorrow's losers.
Industrial strategists have acted as if their principal problem was their support
for government action in the face of a free market current in contemporary
American politics. The real problem, however, is not that industrial strategy
proposes government help to industry but that industrial strategy conditions
government help on a consensus for progress.
The search for consensus does not presume good intentions. It tests the parties'
willingness to compromise by making the application for aid voluntary and
requiring that each request be jointly reviewed by each constituency: labor,
management, government, and consumer. If there is not consensus, there will be
no action. No one is hurt by failure. But if there is consensus then industrial
strategists argue that the government should not only be able to convene the
discussion but should also be able to back its conclusions. The government
should be free today to experiment in the search for a better future just as it has,
so successfully, in the past.
The United States need not mimic the Japanese institutional arrangements-
our traditions are hardly so poor as to require us to imitate others. What is needed
is merely to learn new ways to work together for the common good. What is
needed is merely to remember that we should not be embarrassed by government
action, but should be proud that acting together as one nation we can address our
needs.
